Radowitz' readiness to consign his mission to historical oblivion was, however, shared neither by his contemporaries nor by historians. Much of the continued interest in this affair can be attributed to the war scare which shook Europe shortly after its conclusion. Throughout April of 1875 the German chancellor subjected Fiance to extreme diplomatic pressure, including sabre-rattling in the government-controlled press and threats of preventive war from high-ranking officials 5 . This belligerent posture lent credibility to the claims that the Radowitz mission had been motivated by hostile intentions towards France. As a result of the war scare of 1875 the belief that Radowitz* secret assignment had been to secure diplomatic backing for military action against France became generally accepted by large segments of Europe's political elite. In 1887 these allegations were brought to the attention of the general public when General Adolphe Le Flo, the former In the archives of the German Foreign Office there is an entire volume dedicated to the diplomatic correspondence and press articles generated by Le Flö's revelations: Deutschland 131 d. Vol. 1. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA/AA), Bonn. 7 The most important of these apologetic works is: Holborn, Bismarcks europäische Politik (see fn. 1). Holborn suggests that the official explanation for the mission -the need to replace Alvensleben with a more senior official in order to deal more effectively with Gorchakov -was the only purpose of this initiative. Interestingly he made specific reference to the war guilt clause of the Treaty of Versailles in his application to use the documents of the German foreign ministry. Lappenküper's work represents the most detailed published account of the Radowitz mission since Holborn's study (cf. note 7). It uses a wide variety of archival source material and covers a large time period. However, the author neglected to consult the contents of at least two archival sources containing material essential to an understanding of the subject -the diplomatic correspondence of the Russian foreign ministry (cf. note 29) and the private papers of the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, Henry VII Prince Reuss (cf. note 4). In addition, Lappenküper ignored key material in archives of which he did make use (for example cf. note 70). Due to these omissions and a general lack of detailed analysis the author was unable prevailing interpretation, Bismarck's special emissary had been given the task of obtaining Russia's support for a permanent crippling of France by offering her a »free hand« in Southeastern Europe. The German proposals, as reconstructed by these scholars, included an agreement to sacrifice vital interests of the Habsburg Empire and ultimately its territorial integrity. Radowitz was, in effect, to have proposed a division of the European continent into Russian and German spheres of influence. This portrayal of what transpired in the spring of 1875 implies that the actions of the German envoy represented an aberration in Bismarckian foreign policy. Certainly there is little in Bismarck's actions before or after 1875 that would support the contention that the alleged program of political hegemony played a major role in his long-term strategy. Most adherents of this hypothesis acknowledge that it presupposes a fundamental discontinuity in German foreign policy, but suggest that the negative results of Radowitz' talks in St. Petersburg caused the change. It was, according to this line of argument, only after Russia's refusal of the German overtures in 1875 that Bismarck grasped the impossibility of realizing his grand vision and was forced to fall back upon more conventional strategies 9 . Thus the failure of the initiative of 1875 is seen as a turning point in Bismarck's foreign policy.
A more careful examination of the source material reveals that the mission itself, and not its »failure«, marks the beginning of an approach to international relations that was to characterize Bismarckian diplomacy for the next fifteen years. This strategy found its most cynical expression shortly after Bismarck's triumph as European peacemaker at the Congress of Berlin. In November of 1878 Europe's »honest broker« declared it to be a central axiom of German foreign policy that the »Eastern sore« was to be kept open in order to maintain an international constellation advantageous to Germany; the other European states were to be held in check by ensuring that they remained embroiled in conflicts over control of the territories of the crumbling Ottoman Empire 10 . Prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war in July of 1877 German diplomacy was guided by the same general principle, but the focus was placed upon first bringing about this favorable situation by helping to open up the »Eastern sore«. During those early years this goal was pursued by offering the other major powers strong encouragement to become involved in the partitioning of what remained of Europe's »sick man«. Radowitz' journey to St. Petersburg in February 1875 represented Bismarck's first documented attempt to implement this strategy, and the tactics and aims of this opening gambit can be traced through all of Germany's major diplomatic initiatives concerning the Eastern question leading up to Russia's armed intervention in the summer of 1877. The German chancellor's adoption of a new policy direction at the beginning of 1875 was triggered by fears that political developments in Europe were rapidly increasing the potential for the formation of a coalition of powers directed against the German Empire. Following the victory over France in 1871 the cornerstone of German diplomacy had been the strengthening of ties with Russia and Austria to ensure that the defeated Third Republic remained isolated. At the same time Germany mediated a rapprochement between these two Eastern rivals in order to create a coalition of the three empires based on the aim of preserving the status quo in central Europe. Although this policy led to the formation of a loose alliance in 1873, the so-called Three Emperors League, it proved to be a disappointment as a tool for furthering German interests. The diplomatic support in containing Republican France which Bismarck expected from his conservative allies had not been forthcoming. Russia, in particular, had consistently refused to give her approval to the German strategy of promoting the cause of liberalism in western Europe as a means of ensuring that France remained weak. The Russian government had, in fact, often exerted its influence to oppose German efforts to achieve this objective 11 . Russia's lack of cooperation meant that the danger of France finding coalition partners amongst Europe's monarchies was substantially increased. The need to rectify this situation provided the initial impetus for the diplomatic offensive begun shortly before the Radowitz mission. But the most important factor dictating Bismarck's shift in strategy at the start of 1875 were changes within Russia and Austria. In both countries the groups which favoured a close association with Berlin were rapidly declining in influence and were giving way to forces which opposed that policy. This made the threat of encirclement by hostile powers appear both real and immediate 12 .
On the eve of the Radowitz mission Russia continued to play her traditional role as Germany's closest and most reliable ally, but there were indications that this might soon change. The largest blow to the »German party« at the Russian court came in April of 1874 when Count Peter Shuvalov was removed from his influential position as head of internal security. Shuvalov had been viewed by Bismarck as the strongest force in the Tsar's inner circle of advisors advocating cooperation with Germany; his transfer to a diplomatic post in London raised concerns in Berlin that there would no longer be a check on the influence of the Francophile Russian chancellor, Prince Alexander Gorchakov 13 . These misgivings proved to be well-founded. In the first half of 1874 Gorchakov pursued a policy of close collaboration with France which was most visible in the East where Russia and France worked together on issues such as the control of Ferdinand Lesseps' troubled Suez Canal company 14 . French support of Russia in this and other questions related to the Ot-toman Empire lessened the value of Germany's assistance in that region and was thereby helping to undermine the political basis of the Russo-German entente which was rooted in Berlin's ability to promote Russian goals in the East 15 . There was also a real danger that this Franco-Russian cooperation could be expanded into other areas and eventually grow into a military pact. Developments at court and in the East indicated, therefore, that the consensus within Russia supporting an alliance with Germany was deteriorating. The most dramatic manifestation of this trend was an increase in the number of Russian cavalry divisions stationed on the German border at the beginning of 1875 16 .
Even more alarming to the German chancellor were signs that a crisis facing Germanophile elements in Austria was reaching a climax. Following Austria's defeat in 1866 Bismarck had successfully forged a new relationship with the restructured Habsburg Empire based upon its adherence to the principle of dualism. For Bismarck, Hungary's equal role in the determination of the external affairs of the empire guaranteed that Austria would transfer the focus of her foreign policy to Southeastern Europe and away from Germany. This redirection of Austrian energies towards the East had been formalized by the appointment of a Hungarian, Count Julius Andrassy, to the post of foreign minister in November 1871 17 . The greater influence of the eastern half of the empire upon the formulation of foreign policy implied by this change strengthened the relationship between Berlin and Vienna. However, in the following years Budapest was rocked by a major financial crisis. As a result, it appeared that Hungary, despite political and economic aid from Berlin, would soon be incapable of carrying her share of the empire's fiscal burden. This in turn raised the possibility of a return to a centralist form of government, dominated by the German portion of the empire 18 . In Berlin it was feared that the collapse of the system of constitutional dualism would mean a victory for the »revisionist« party which, led by Archduke Albert, sought to reverse the defeat of 1866 and to regain Austria's leadership of Germany. These concerns were heightened by reports received from Prague and Vienna during the weeks prior to Radowitz' special mission indicating that the influence of this group was increasing and that the fall of Andrassy, and the political system he represented, was imminent 19 .
In both Vienna and St. Petersburg, therefore, the potential for a sudden shift towards a policy of confrontation with Germany appeared to be increasing. Ironically the AustroRussian rapprochement, which Bismarck had helped to bring about, was in part responsible The danger of a hostile coalition meant that loosening the ties between Austria and Russia became a primary objective of German foreign policy at the beginning of 1875 and caused the change in tactics which led directly to the Radowitz mission. Of course this general aim was not new. Bismarck had been aware that his success in reducing tensions between Austria and Russia could lead to a decrease in political support from his allies and even to an anti-German coalition. For that reason he had acted according to the principle that within the alliance of the three empires the two other participants were to be only as near to one another as it suited German interests 23 . But events in the latter half of 1874 had shown that the German chancellor no longer possessed enough political leverage to prevent Vienna and St. Petersburg from building a relationship which posed a potential threat to Germany. There was therefore a clear need to find new ways to bring the two allied empires once again into a position of dependency upon Germany and to dampen the ardor of their friendship. Since the ambitions of Austria and Russia were directed towards the East, Bismarck looked to solve his dilemma by encouraging both powers to pursue their conflicting political programmes in that region. A more active Eastern policy on the part of Germany's allies promised to create political entanglements which would rekindle their rivalry and force them to look once again to developments in Southeastern Europe at the end of 1874 offered opportunities to push both powers in this direction, Bismarck was quick to seize them. The first phase of this diplomatic offensive was dominated by attempts to manipulate increasing tensions in the East to force Russia to end her uncooperative attitude towards German efforts to isolate France. In October 1874 the massacre of a number of Montenegrins by Turkish soldiers near the town of Podgoritza gave rise to protracted diplomatic activity. In St. Petersburg there was outrage over the murder of Christians and strong pressure was exerted on the Turkish government to punish the perpetrators. At the same time, Prince Nicholas of Montenegro took advantage of this incident to seek international support for his efforts to achieve independence from the Sultan. During the negotiations which followed Germany was slow to respond to Russian requests for assistance and took up a position of reserve towards the demarches in favour of Prince Nicholas which gave rise to increasing exasperation in St. Petersburg 24 . That was precisely the reaction those moves were intended to provoke. Bismarck was clearly using this occasion to turn the tables on Gorchakov. In the previous months, it was the German chancellor who had seen his diplomatic initiatives weakened by Russia's failure to give them strong backing. Now the roles were reversed and he was exploiting the situation to give the Russian government an object lesson. Gorchakov was being shown that if Germany chose to adopt an approach to RussoGerman cooperation similar to Russia's then Russian interests in the East would suffer just as Germany's had suffered in the West.
This underlying goal of demonstrating Germany's power to influence the success or failure of Russian plans in Southeastern Europe is much more apparent in simultaneous negotiations over what began as a question of diplomatic etiquette. In August 1874 the German consul at Belgrade had reported that he was not being accorded the proper seniority by his colleagues because he did not have the title »diplomatic agent«, an artificial rank adopted by the other foreign representatives to flatter Serbia's ambitions to full statehood 25 . The matter was ignored by the German Foreign Office for a number of months. Then amidst the negotiations over the Podgoritza affair, Bismarck appealed to St. Petersburg, and other governments, for support in securing the proper position in the Serbian consular corps for Germany's representative. Given the lack of importance of this post to Germany, the matter was pursued with surprising energy. When the Russian government was reluctant to instruct its representative in Belgrade to support the position of the German consul, Bismarck took the drastic step of appealing directly to the Sultan, who was responsible for Serbia's foreign relations, to intervene in the dispute 26 . This move stood in direct opposition to St. Petersburg's political agenda. It ran contrary to Russia's efforts to support Serbian independence by formally recognizing the Sultan's continued control over Belgrade's dealings with other states. Also it could only encourage the Turkish leadership to resist pressure to resolve the Podgoritza affair by raising further doubts about the sincerity of German support for Russian remonstrances. The message being sent to St. Petersburg through this deliberate disregard for Russia's interests in the East was unmistakable. The Russian government's reluctance in the preceding months to show solidarity on issues of importance to Berlin indicated that German backing in the East was being taken for granted in St. Petersburg. Bismarck's handling of the Belgrade affair, and the Podgoritza crisis, was designed to demonstrate to Russia the importance of Berlin's influence in the East and implicitly called upon her to be more supportive of German objectives in the west if she wished to ensure that it continued to be used in her favor.
In order to maximize the effect, and minimize the damage, of these abrasive actions in the East the German chancellor wished to make his point explicitly to the Russian leaders. Herein lay, however, a major difficulty. Caught in the diplomatic cross-fire caused by Bismarck's political offensive was the young German charge d'affaires, Frederick von Alvensleben. During the tensions resulting from Germany's apparent indifference to Russian aims in the East, this talented, but inexperienced Prussian diplomat proved to be no match for a seasoned statesman like Gorchakov. He was repeatedly forced onto the defensive and slowly became just a passive medium for communicating the Russian foreign minister's protests to Berlin. Originally Bismarck had intended to convey the meaning of his unfriendly behavior in the East through Alvensleben. In fact the German charge had been sent a despatch in which the outline of a lecture on the necessity of »reciprocity« in Russo-German relations had been included. Particular emphasis was placed upon Germany's expectation of Russian support in the West in return for her assistance in the East. But Alvensleben was ordered not to make these representations to the Russian chancellor until he received special authorization to do so 27 . As it turned out, this authorization was never given. Shortly after the despatch was sent, Alvensleben's continued uncritical reporting of Gorchakov's protests over German moves in the East finally convinced Bismarck that he was not equal to the task of making the desired impression on the Russian government 28 . However Alvensleben's inability to effectively deal with Gorchakov did not cause the Radowitz mission; it merely provided Bismarck with a useful rationale for sending a more senior diplomat to St. Petersburg 29 . This does not mean that Bismarck's desire to have a more experienced official deliver the political »lesson« underlying his moves in the East was merely a facade. On the contrary, the source material shows quite clearly that the task of explaining to Russia's leaders Germany's expectation of support in the West in return for her aid in the East figured prominently in the chancellor's verbal instructions to his emissary 30 . The subject of »reciprocity« is also a recurring theme in Radowitz' official communications to the Russian government during his mission. However it was only a secondary factor in the decision to send a special envoy to St. Petersburg. A hint at its deeper objectives is provided by the young charge d'affaires himself. Upon Radowitz' arrival Alvensleben, who was understandably concerned about his career in the foreign service, was reassured that the primary purpose of the diplomatic mission was to conduct discussions about aspects of the Eastern question not suited for the exchange of written despatches 31 . High-level talks about sensitive facets of the Eastern question, and not the replacement of a junior diplomat, were the real aim of Bismarck's initiative.
Bismarck's desire for these negotiations was the direct result of his strategic interest in opening up the Eastern »sore« in order to stabilize Germany's increasingly exposed international position. The timing of a political action aimed at achieving this goal appeared to be very favorable at the beginning of 1875. In the weeks prior to Radowitz' departure the German Foreign Office had received reports from numerous sources indicating that Russia was about to take up a more aggressive posture regarding the Eastern question. They also clearly identified the origin of this political trend. Radowitz' counterpart in the Russian foreign ministry, Peter Stremoukov, was beginning to play a larger role in the formulation of policy and his influence was being used to promote a more belligerent stance towards Turkey 32 . During the Podgoritza crisis there were clear signs that Stremoukov's chauvinistic views were gaining favour with Russia's decision-makers. Prince Nicholas' efforts to politically exploit the massacre at Podgoritza were interpreted in Berlin as evidence of Russian encouragement to take up a more antagonistic position toward the government in Constantinople 33 . At the peak of the crisis this hard-line approach to the Ottoman Empire became more open. In the course of a diplomatic reception at the beginning of January the Tsar threatened the Turkish ambassador with dire consequences if the Podgoritza matter were not resolved to Russia's satisfaction. This incident caused a sensation in the diplomatic corps and in the international press as it was seen as a sign of impending war 34 . What made all these symptoms of increasing Russian belligerence particularly interesting from a German point of view was a simultaneous change that appeared to be taking place in English policy towards the Ottoman Empire. According to the German ambassador in London, Great Britain was abandoning her commitment to maintain the territorial integrity of Turkey at all costs. Politicians in London were indicating that they would be willing to tolerate Russian territorial gains in the East in return for control of the Suez Canal 35 . The potential benefits of this scenario to Germany were enormous. Russia's rivalry with Austria would be significantly intensified forcing both powers to rely more heavily on Berlin. Great Britain's presence in Egypt would also mean greater Anglo-French tensions which would help to ensure France's continued diplomatic isolation. Finally, the nascent Franco-Russian entente in the East, which was largely based on a common front against England's Suez policy, would be shattered before it could evolve into an alliance. Given the immediate danger of a change of Austria's political system and the poor state of Russo-German relations, a delay in taking advantage of this situation could have been disastrous. The German chancellor could not, therefore, await Reuss' convalescence to take the initiative. Since Alvensleben had shown that he was not equal to a major political undertaking of this kind, a special mission offered the best solution. Radowitz was selected to commence these sensitive negotiations at the beginning of 1875 because he was intimately familiar with the intricacies of the Eastern question and because he enjoyed Bismarck's full confidence.
Although the change in German strategy signalled by the Radowitz mission was dictated primarily by developments in St. Petersburg and Vienna, it found its first practical expression with regard to French designs on Tunisia. Just a few weeks prior to Radowitz' arrival in St. Petersburg, Bismarck had responded to reports of renewed French attempts to wrest control of this territory from Turkey by instructing his representatives in Paris and Tunis not to oppose them 36 . Similar directives were issued regarding French efforts to gain influence in other areas of the Ottoman Empire. The chancellor's instructions represented a reversal of the previous German policy which had consistently countered any French moves in that direction. The avowed intent of the new approach was to divert French energies to the periphery of Europe where they would inevitably trigger conflicts with other powers, in particular Great Britain. These tensions, Bismarck hoped, would prevent the two western powers from forming a close political bond. Here then was a candid admission of the tactical considerations underlying Bismarck's new interest in the Eastern question: it offered an ideal means of forestalling hostile alliances involving powers with conflicting claims on the territories of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore these instructions document the first actual application of the emerging diplomatic paradigm as it was being used to deal with the vengeful French Republic. By also encouraging the involvement of the British and Russian governments in the partitioning of the Sultan's domains Bismarck strove to create a situation in which the remainder of the major European powers could be managed in the same way as France. Radowitz' »secret« assignment during his stay in St. Petersburg was to work towards the realization of this political system by offering Russia's leaders German support for a more bellicose Eastern policy and by seeking their agreement to accept a British presence in Egypt.
Initially, however, it was Radowitz' »official« mandate, his efforts to reinforce the meaning of Bismarck's conscious neglect of Russian interests in the East, which stood in the forefront of his activity. The target for his lectures on the need for greater Russian support of Germany's policies in the west was Peter Stremoukov, the chief of the Asiatic Department in the Russian Foreign Ministry. In fact the German envoy dealt almost exclusively with Stremoukov during his five weeks as head of the embassy. The correspondence between Radowitz and the Foreign Office provides a fairly clear picture of the course of their discussions about the principle of reciprocity. At first the German envoy restricted his criticism of Russia's failure to stand by Germany in the international arena to the issues surrounding the treatment of the German consul in Belgrade 37 . He later received instructions from Berlin to extend these representations to Russia's lack of cooperation in containing France. In this context he stressed Germany's readiness to support Russian policies in the East on the condition that Russia reciprocate by assisting in efforts to ensure that France remained isolated and peaceful 38 . At the end of the mission Radowitz concluded from his conversations with Stremoukov on this subject that the demonstration of Germany's power in the East had achieved the desired result. The Russian government had been made to realize the value of German assistance and Bismarck's envoy foresaw that it would now go out of its way to demonstrate a stronger desire to cooperate with Berlin in other areas 39 . In short, the »lesson« -as Radowitz referred to it -had been understood 40 .
Radowitz' discussions about reciprocity were linked in a number of ways to his primary task which was to offer Russia encouragement to pursue a more active role in Southeastern Europe. His conversations with Stremoukov about the necessity for a political relationship based upon mutual benefit led naturally to an open exchange of views regarding Russia's ultimate goals in the East and Germany's willingness to support them. They supplied, therefore, an ideal lead-in for Radowitz to widen the scope of these talks and to offer assistance for a policy of territorial aggrandizement. The »official« portion of Radowitz' mission also points to the real purpose of his »secret« offer. Bismarck's demands for reciprocity reflected his need to secure a higher level of Russian support for German policies and to shore up the weakening political entente between the two powers. Although the German chancellor certainly hoped that the »lesson« he had given to Russia would lead to a greater consideration of his interests in western Europe, he realized that ultimately the Russian government's commitment to back Germany's policies was a function of the amount of help it required in the East. It was precisely this dependence upon support from Berlin that Radowitz' encouragement of Russian expansion in the East was aimed at strengthening.
Although the available sources do not provide much detail regarding Radowitz' sensitive discussions about Russia's goals in the East, they allow the general circumstances and content of the German envoy's soundings to be reconstructed with a reasonable degree of certainty. Radowitz directed his overtures to only one Russian politician during his stay and it is significant that Stremoukov was chosen to be this contact. He had been the most outspoken advocate of a more bellicose posture towards the Turks and it could therefore be anticipated that he would be the individual most likely to be receptive to promises of support for a more ambitious approach to the Eastern question. Radowitz was nevertheless cautious in broaching this subject. He delayed putting out feelers until shortly before Reuss' return on March 11 and his most revealing remarks were couched in a tone of levity 41 . Essentially he asked Stremoukov to outline the nature of Russian designs on the Ottoman Empire and its territories, hinting that Germany would not stand in the way of a more aggressive Russian posture in the region. In response, Stremoukov insisted that Russia was only interested in maintaining the status quo and it does not appear that these discussions went any further. The intent of the probe was nonetheless clear to the Russian government and led to Radowitz being referred to by Gorchakov as the »siren, to whose song one dared not listen.« 42 This colorful metaphor was quite appropriate. Russia's veteran statesman correctly understood that Radowitz' seductive overtures were meant to lure him into a course of territorial expansion in the East which would inevitably steer the Russian ship of state into the treacherous waters of political entanglements with Austria and Great Britain.
Other aspects of these confidential discussions about the Eastern question indicate that Radowitz' interest in Russia's territorial ambitions was never intended to be the prelude to an offer of a »blank cheque«. Indeed, a significant part of Radowitz' talks with Stremoukov involved attempting to persuade him that by adopting different tactics in the East, Russia could achieve her goals without risking a major European war. He recommended, for example, that Russia abandon her opposition to England's plans to gain control of the Suez Canal 43 . Although there is no evidence that he expressly linked this concession to a greater British willingness to tolerate Russian territorial gains in Southeastern Europe, a connection did exist as Radowitz knew from the reports out of London. The German envoy also disputed the efficacy of Russia's use of Slavic nationalism as a tool for achieving her ends 44 This aspect of Russia's Eastern policy posed the greatest threat to the Habsburg Empire with its large Slavic population. Radowitz' concern for this vital Austrian interest in the Balkans suggests that, even if the response to his encouragement of Russian expansion into Southeastern Europe had been more enthusiastic, this would not have led to proposals that involved endangering the viability of the Dual Monarchy.
Stremoukov was not receptive to either of Radowitz' policy recommendations and it seems that both men became involved in acrimonious discussions involving the Eastern question. The German diplomat complained that Stremoukov had slipped through his fingers »like an eel« and his Russian counterpart certainly adhered to the principle of reciprocity in expressing similar sentiments 45 . As a result the two statesmen developed a strong dislike for one another. Radowitz' reports reflected this personal and political animosity. They quite candidly conveyed his overall impression that Stremoukov was not a friend of Germany and would not adopt the approach to the Eastern question which he had been advocating 46 . This assessment strongly influenced the next phase of Bismarck's diplomatic offensive and probably triggered it 47 .
The impact of Stremoukov's rejection of Germany's proposed approach to the Eastern question is evident in confidential disclosures made to England near the end of Radowitz' mission. On March 9 Bismarck had a long conversation with the British ambassador, Odo Russell, during which he made a »private« communication concerning the Suez Canal 48 . In the course of this frank exchange of views, he recognized England's legitimate interest in controlling that strategic waterway and expressed support for her endeavors to realize that goal. To facilitate London's Suez policy, the German chancellor offered his services as a mediator to overcome Russian opposition, but warned that Stremoukov was hostile to both Germany and Great Britain and would use his increasing influence to resist an English presence in Egypt. Bismarck added that Gorchakov also shared this unfriendly disposition. As an alternative negotiating partner he pointed to Peter Shuvalov, the Russian ambassador in London. According to Bismarck this was a Russian statesman friendly to both countries with whom one could do business. He suggested, therefore, that both powers had a common interest in ensuring that events followed a course that would allow Shuvalov to replace Gorchakov as Russia's foreign minister. This policy statement illustrates Bismarck's determination to continue the diplomatic initiative begun by the Radowitz mission as well as the changes to his strategy that had been dictated by the negative reception of the German envoy's soundings in St. Petersburg. Radowitz' reports had revealed that Stremoukov was an obstacle to the implementation of Germany's new Eastern strategy. In turning to England for support in furthering his policy aims, Bismarck sought to overcome that obstruction by using Shuvalov to bypass official Russian channels. The Russian ambassador was to become the focus for attempts to persuade the Tsar to reach an understanding with London over the Suez Canal. It is also clear from these communications that he intended to use such an agreement with London to discredit Gorchakov. This approach promised to serve German interests in two ways. Firstly, the successful mediation of an Anglo-Russian arrangement over mutual territorial gains in the East would have allowed Russia to become more deeply involved in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, increasing her dependence upon Germany. Secondly, Shuvalov's recall to the Tsar's inner council of ministers as a reward for these acquisitions in the Balkan peninsula would have strengthened the »German party« in St. Petersburg.
At the same time Bismarck's communications regarding the Suez Canal represented a clear extension of his bid to involve the other powers in the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire. Britain, like Russia, was being encouraged by offers of assistance to move forward with her plans to seize control of strategically important parts of the Sultan's domains. Unlike Radowitz' overtures, however, these new proposals were quite concrete and specific. The British Foreign Office was being prepared for the opening of negotiations with Russia about the Suez question which were to be mediated and controlled by Germany. In the expectation that the beginning of Anglo-Russian talks was imminent, Bismarck informed Russell in some detail of his intention to renew diplomatic efforts to promote this arrangement in St. Petersburg. The British ambassador was told that Reuss was returning to St. Petersburg with explicit instructions to bring Russia to the bargaining table 49 . The intent of this disclosure was to foster Anglo-German cooperation in dealing with Russia. A close working relationship with England would position Germany to mediate an agreement between London and St. Petersburg regarding their respective spheres of influence in the Ottoman Empire. Ultimately this arrangement would not only have entangled Great Britain in Egyptian affairs, but also opened the way for Russian expansion into Southeastern Europe.
The emphasis placed upon Shuvalov as a key figure in these preliminary negotiations reflects Bismarck's decision to concentrate his efforts upon elements in the Russian government still friendly to Germany as he moved towards renewing the policy recommendations first put forward by Radowitz. That focus was reflected in the instructions Reuss received prior to his return to St. Petersburg on March 11. He was ordered to direct the attention of the Tsar and some of his Germanophile advisors towards the Suez Canal as a territorial concession which could be made to London in order to improve Anglo-Russian relations 50 . Like Radowitz' previous soundings, these proposals were to be made with great caution. The German ambassador was to avoid conveying the impression that his suggestions with regard to Egypt were in any way officially, sanctioned. He was also tasked with continuing to stress the necessity of reciprocity ät every opportunity. In the context of these discussions, Reuss repeated Germany's willingness to aid Russia in »con-solidating« her interests in the East. He also underlined the value of the entente with Germany by pointing out that the Eastern question could enter into a critical stage at any time sl . In all respects, therefore, Reuss was continuing the strategy that had been initiated by the Radowitz mission. There is no evidence that the negative reaction to the special envoy's soundings caused a »turning point« in German policy; the only change was a shift in focus from Stremoukov to the »German party«.
In keeping with this change in tactics it was a representative of the »German party« to whom Bismarck turned for support when he decided to abandon much of his earlier caution and intervened directly in the renewed efforts to influence Russia's Eastern policy. On March 18 the German chancellor took advantage of a private, after-dinner conversation with Peter Shuvalov, who was passing through Berlin on his way from London to St. Petersburg, to candidly present his political program 5 . ©lese proposals centered around an offer of closer political cooperation based upon support for Russia's aims in the East in return for stronger backing of German objectives in western Europe. Bismarck also suggested how he would like to see this assistance in the East used: the Three Emperors' League was to be exploited much more energetically to dictate solutions to issues which had been previously viewed as »untouchable« -a clear reference to the Eastern question 53 . Essentially Bismarck was reiterating the messages conveyed by Radowitz. Germany's desire for a greater Russian adherence to the principle of reciprocity was restated and an aggressive Russian policy in the East was more openly advocated. But for the first time these two aspects of Bismarck's diplomatic initiative were juxtaposed. As a result, the German chancellor's attempts to coax Russia into a policy of territorial expansion in the East appeared to be directly linked to his demands for greater support in his efforts to contain France. This suggested that Bismarck was trying to obtain a »free hand« in the West by offering Russia territorial gains in the East. At least this was how these overtures came to be interpreted in St. Petersburg in the following weeks.
But there is clear evidence that it was never Bismarck's intention to offer Shuvalov a »free hand« in the East at the expense of English or Austrian interests. A central part of the German chancellor's proposals was his recommendation that the Russian ambassador seek to convince the Tsar of the advantages to be gained from allowing England to take control of the Suez Canal. Indeed Bismarck hoped that Shuvalov would be able to return to London with concrete Russian offers regarding Egypt 54 . It was this hope which also underlay the disclosures to Russell on March 9. Their purpose had been to prepare the British government for Shuvalov coming forward as the architect of an Anglo-Russian understanding on the Eastern question. Nine days later the German chancellor was at- tempting to convince Shuvalov to take on this role and to support his policy recommendations in St. Petersburg. The purpose of Bismarck's proposals, like Radowitz' earlier overtures, was to help open up the Eastern question. But there was also a new component. As Bismarck had candidly confided to Russell, he was endeavoring to ensure Shuvalov's return to his former position of power in Russia by helping him to achieve significant diplomatic successes. The Russian ambassador's personal interest in seeing Germany's strategy successfully implemented was also stressed during discussions aimed at securing his collaboration 55 . Bismarck's aim in seeking the ex-minister's reinstatement was clearly to end the crisis in Russo-German relations which his removal had helped to create. Of course, Shuvalov would only have been able to reap the fruits of this political understanding if a British seizure of the Suez Canal was soon followed by corresponding Russian gains in the East. Ensuring Shuvalov's return to power was therefore another reason Bismarck sought to facilitate Russian expansion in the East through the mediation of an Anglo-Russian arrangement over possession of that waterway 56 . A similar strategy of using political successes in the East to support pro-German forces is also apparent in simultaneous overtures made to the Austrian government.
By the beginning of April 1875 Bismarck had taken steps to encourage France, Russia, and Great Britain to carve out those pieces of the Ottoman Empire which each coveted. The only major power untouched by the German leader's largesse was Austria. This apparent omission has led some scholars to conclude that Bismarck's offers of support to Russia implied an intent to sacrifice vital interests of the Habsburg Monarchy in Southeastern Europe. In reality there was no omission, only a delay. The failure to incorporate Vienna into the earlier phases of the German diplomatic offensive was more due to lack of opportunity than design. At the first sign of an inclination on the part of Austria's leaders to pursue a bolder approach to the Eastern question, Bismarck conveyed the same words of support to Vienna as he had instructed Radowitz to communicate to St. Petersburg.
The exact timing of this feeler is unclear, but it was probably made by the German ambassador in Vienna, Lothar von Schweinitz, shortly after his return from a brief vacation in Berlin during the first week of April. The immediate occasion for Bismarck's overture was an upcoming visit of Emperor Francis Joseph to the Austrian province of Dalmatia. Although the emperor's trip was essentially an internal matter, it had profound foreign policy implications. The presence of the imperial entourage in Dalmatia was seen by the rebellious Christian population of the adjacent Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a demonstration of support, encouraging them to take up arms. The resulting unrest could be easily foreseen and was anticipated by Schweinitz 57 . Bismarck was also aware that influential groups in Austria, especially in the military, wished to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were considered to be a necessary hinterland to the strategically important Dalmatian coast. Therefore Vienna's apparent desire to stir rebellion in this region through the emperor's tour of the adjacent Austrian territory could only be viewed in Berlin as a clear indication that the Habsburg Empire was about to take steps to secure those territories. The German chancellor's reaction to this symptom of awakening Austrian ambitions in the East was completely in line with Radowitz' special mission and aimed at furthering the same strategic objectives. Bismarck appears to have instructed Schweinitz to assure Andrassy of German support should he decide to seize control of a »piece of Herzegovina«. However the Austrian foreign minister declined this offer, remarking sarcastically that he could hardly accept a gift he would have to obtain for himself 58 . Like Radowitz' communications, the offer of support for Austrian expansion in the East did not represent a radical departure in German foreign policy. Bismarck had already given Andrassy assurances that he would not oppose an Austrian move to gain control of Bosnia and Herzegovina 59 . What was new in the German initiative was the focus on actively encouraging the Habsburg Empire to pursue this course of action. The Dual Monarchy -like Russia, France and Great Britain before her -was being emboldened by offers of German support to seek territorial gains at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.
The general political situation in Austria made the adoption of such a course by Vienna of special interest to Germany. According to the reports received in Berlin Andrassy's hold on power was precarious. Given the importance to Germany of the Hungarian statesman's continued control of Austrian foreign policy Bismarck was anxious to prevent his fall. Creating opportunities for major foreign policy successes in the East was an obvious and effective means to keep Andrassy in office. But the German chancellor probably saw the real long-term stabilization of Andrassy's position as a necessary byproduct of the primary purpose of his efforts to reopen the Eastern question which was to increase Austria's dependence upon Germany by intensifying the rivalry between St. Petersburg and Vienna. From a purely tactical point of view, an offer of support in the East to Andrassy was necessary in order to limit the damage that could be done by Russian attempts to use the proposals made to Stremoukov and Shuvalov to sow distrust between Vienna and Berlin. Even though Schweinitz' offer was refused it served to reassure Austria that Germany had no intention of sacrificing her legitimate interests in the Balkans. This clear signal to Vienna would serve to counter any Russian claims that Germany had been attempting to strengthen the alliance with Russia by abandoning the Habsburg Empire. Given the close ties between Austria and Russia, and the increasing influence of forces hostile to Berlin in both countries, intrigues of this kind could be easily anticipated, particularly after the rejection of Radowitz' proposals. In fact, Gorchakov's efforts to portray Bismarck's diplomatic initiative as being directed against Vienna began almost immediately after Germany's special envoy left Russia. However, these initial indiscretions were restricted to a confidential communication to Vienna of Shuvalov's conversations during his stay in Berlin which were colored to make it appear that Bismarck had made proposals hostile to the Habsburg Empire 60 . At this stage Radowitz' soundings received no mention.
But soon after Shuvalov's return to St. Petersburg Gorchakov began to see the Radowitz mission in a new light and to understand its potential as a political weapon. When Shuvalov arrived in St. Petersburg on March 19, there was still some confusion in the Russian foreign ministry about the true purpose of the Radowitz initiative. During the special envoy's stay, the Russian leaders had been expecting him to come forward with some major political proposal 61 . Since this did not occur, they had some difficulty understanding the objective of the special mission. That all seems to have changed when Shuvalov informed the foreign ministry of Bismarck's confidential communications to him. In Gorchakov's eyes, Radowitz' discussions about »reciprocity« and his encouragement of Russian territorial ambitions took on a new significance. It appears that as a result of Shuvalov's account of his conversation with Bismarck, the Russian chancellor formulated a new hypothesis, a »personal conjecture«, about the meaning of Radowitz' overtures. According to this theory, the German envoy's interest in Russia's territorial aims in the East was but a prelude to a more concrete political offer. If Stremoukov had acknowledged any Russian desire to expand in the East, speculated Gorchakov, might not Radowitz have had instructions to promise Russia »complete and absolute« support for those wishes in return for a similar Russian commitment to stand by Germany in the west? The Russian chancellor felt that this sort of grand scheme was in accordance with Bismarck's past pattern of political behavior 62 . It was these speculations by the Russian foreign minister, combined with a large amount of political expediency, which led in the following weeks to the creation of the legends about the Radowitz mission which have exerted such a detrimental influence on historical research up to the present. A month after Gorchakov formulated his »personal conjecture«, it was presented in a somewhat embellished form to the diplomatic corps in St. Petersburg as a factual account of Radowitz' activities during his sojourn on the Neva. Stremoukov, presumably acting on instructions from Gorchakov, was the source of these »revelations« to the heads of all of the major foreign missions 63 . This account centered around a largely verbatim description of Radowitz' probes regarding Russia's claims upon the territories of the Ottoman Empire. But it went beyond the facts by alleging that the German envoy's soundings were followed by an offer to give Russia a »free hand« to realize those aims in return for a similar freedom of action for Germany in the West. It also implied that Bismarck was demanding this »blank cheque« in the West in order to attack France before she had completed her recovery. These latter claims had no basis in fact and were clearly tailored to fit immediate Russian foreign policy objectives. Gorchakov's »revelations« occurred at the height of a tense Franco-German war scare which he was positioning himself to exploit. The Russian version of the Radowitz mission supported this maneuver by lending credibility to the existence of a real danger of war. It also highlighted Russia's commitment to peace by stressing her rejection of Germany's offers of support for aggression in the East. The creation of this »legend« surrounding the Radowitz mission served, therefore, to help Gorchakov present himself as the guarantor of peace in Europe when he accompanied the Tsar to Berlin at the beginning of May and joined with England in warning Bismarck that a German attack on France would not be tolerated 64 .
While Gorchakov was preparing the ground for his appearance in Berlin as peacemaker, Bismarck had his own agenda for the upcoming meeting with the Tsar. With the help of Reuss and Shuvalov, Emperor Alexander II had been introduced to the key aspects of Bismarck's proposed strategy of Russo-German cooperation in the East. The German chancellor hoped to build upon this preparatory work to make his case to the Tsar directly during his stay in Berlin 65 . Gorchakov appears, however, to have prevented this exchange of views from taking place; according to Radowitz, the Eastern question was not discussed during the emperor's visit 66 . However, Gorchakov claims that Bismarck did in fact renew his offer of support in the East in their private discussions 67 . If this is true, it underlines once again that the primary goal of all of the German overtures was not to secure a far-reaching alliance with Russia. After Gorchakov's coup in Berlin as »peace-maker« Bismarck could not possibly have entertained any hope of obtaining a »free hand« from Russia to cripple France. Therefore the only purpose of this renewed offer of assistance could have been to embroil Russia in the Eastern question so that she would be in greater need of Germany. But once again there was no Russian interest in the German proposals and the diplomatic defeat which Gorchakov inflicted upon his German colleague signalled the end of Bismarck's first attempt to implement his strategy of using the Eastern question to play the other European powers off against one another.
In the following months the outbreak of an armed rebellion in Bosnia and Herzegovina created a situation that allowed Bismarck to revive his initiative with much better prospects for success. When the German chancellor returned to Berlin from a lengthy »sab-batical« on his estates at the end of 1875 he did not wait long to take advantage of the crisis in the Balkans to more openly pursue the strategy begun a year earlier. On January 4, 1876 Bismarck explained to the Russian ambassador in Berlin, Paul Oubril, that Germany viewed developments in the East for the most part with indifference. However, he was very much interested in maintaining good relations with England and ensuring that Andrassy remained in power. With regard to the latter point the chancellor explained his continued concern that centralist intrigues could succeed in removing the Austrian Foreign Minister from power. To counter this threat the German chancellor proposed that Russia agree to the incorporation of Bosnia into the Habsburg Empire. This foreign policy success, the chancellor felt, would help Andrassy to consolidate his position. In return, Russia could reclaim Bessarabia from the Ottoman Empire. Bismarck argued that England's acceptance of these territorial gains could be obtained quite easily through concessions regarding the Suez Canal, but insisted that he be allowed to negotiate such an arrangement himself 68 .
In reacting to these proposals, Gorchakov did not explicitly refer to the events of the previous spring, but he clearly recognized the continuity in German policy. He condemned, for example, Bismarck's »constant« efforts to place himself in a position to mediate disputes involving the interests of the other great powers in the East. Gorchakov also repeated his refusal to be seduced by the new German overtures into pursuing a policy of territorial aggrandizement, referring to Bismarck as the »tempter on the mountain« 69 . The Russian chancellor chose his metaphors slightly differently than a year previously, but the perception of continuity was clear. As in the spring of 1875 Bismarck was encouraging a more aggressive Russian policy, and seeking thereby to create conflicts over the Eastern question that would allow Berlin to intervene as an arbitrator. The German chancellor openly sought this role in dealing with England's interests in the East. In the case of Austria, it was understood that Germany's services as an »honest broker« would be required to ensure that both parties would not be forced into a military conflict with one another.
The similarities between the initiatives of 1875 and 1876 did not only encompass aims. The specific program proposed to Oubril was virtually identical to the one underlying Bismarck's overtures at the time of the Radowitz mission: Russia was to regain the territories lost in 1856 in return for Bosnia being ceded to Austria, and the Suez Canal to Great Britain. The parallels between the initiatives of 1875 and 1876 were so striking that they were explicitly noted by at least one observer. A few weeks after Bismarck's conversation with Oubril, the Austrian ambassador in Berlin, Count Aloys Karolyi, learned of the German suggestion that the Dual Monarchy be permitted to take control of Bosnia. Karolyi saw in this initiative a repeat of the German proposals made in St. Petersburg and Vienna at the time of the Radowitz mission. These overtures, he concluded, showed that Bismarck was willing to grant Russia and Austria a »free hand« in carving up the Ottoman Empire in return for assurances of benevolent neutrality in the event of a French attempt to regain the territory lost in 1871 70 .
The German proposals of early 1876 were once again unsuccessful, but tensions between Turkey and Russia continued to build in the following months providing Bismarck with another opportunity in the second half of 1876 to realize the goals of the strategy begun during the Radowitz mission. In the summer of 1876 events in the Balkans put Russia under mounting pressure to take a direct hand in the Eastern crisis. As a result there was increasing Russian interest in the position Germany would take in the event of hostilities with Turkey. At the end of August Russia appeared to be on the brink of war and was looking to Berlin for reassurance. Of course Bismarck was quite anxious to express his support for a military solution to the crisis but he found himself in a situation similar to the one he faced in January of 1875: Schweinitz, who had since become Germany's ambassador in St. Petersburg, was on leave so there was no means of communicating directly with the Russian Emperor. As in the spring of 1875 Bismarck chose to solve this problem by sending a special envoy to the Tsar armed with words of encouragement. Field Marshal Edwin von Manteuffel was given the task of assuring Alexander II that in the event of Russian military action he could unequivocally count on Germany to adopt the same posture of benevolent neutrality as Russia had done in 1866 and 1870 71 .
Manteuffel's special mission and the negotiations to which it gave rise provide a number of valuable insights into the aims of the similar assignment that had been given to Radowitz over a year earlier. In the discussions that developed as a result of Manteuffel's communications, Gorchakov suggested formalizing German promises of assistance in a treaty of alliance. Bismarck reacted favorably to this proposal, indicating that an agreement to support Russia through »thick and thin« might be made in return for a guarantee of Germany's western borders 72 . However the Russian chancellor was not willing to enter into negotiations on this basis and nothing came of those talks. Nevertheless they are of interest for two reasons. Firstly, they highlight the implausibility of the hypothesis that the Radowitz mission was directed at securing Russian neutrality in the event of a German attack upon France. In a much more favorable negotiating position in 1876, Bismarck restricted his demands to the purely defensive one of a formal Russian recognition of the territorial status quo created by the Treaty of Frankfurt. His goals in the spring of 1875 were doubtless the same. Secondly, the favorable German response to the proposed alliance with Russia to ensure her share of the spoils resulting from a war with Turkey raises the question of whether Bismarck intended to opt for Russia and sacrifice Austria 73 . This is an issue that has also played a major role in the literature surrounding the Radowitz mission. With respect to Manteuffel's assignment, it has been correctly pointed out that too much emphasis should not be placed upon Bismarck's apparent interest in an alliance with Russia because the real focus of German policy at that time was to give Russia enough confidence to allow her to proceed with a policy of military intervention. The »negotiations« resulting from the Manteuffel mission, it has been argued, must therefore be seen as a means to an end. Their goal was never to secure a treaty, but to encourage the Tsar to go to war with Turkey. As was the case in the spring of 1875, Bismarck never seriously considered choosing Russia over Austria.
This view finds strong support in Radowitz' own account of the aims of the Manteuffel mission. According to his version of events, the German government regarded a Russian invasion of Turkey as the most desirable development in the East. At the time of the Manteuffel initiative Radowitz reports that there was general satisfaction in the German Foreign Office that Russia had learned to appreciate the value of German support as a result of her entanglement in Eastern affairs; but at the same time it was seen as necessary to provide assurances of Germany's absolute commitment to stand by her in the event of war. The verbal promises of support, which Manteuffel was tasked to convey, were clearly timed to assist the Tsar in deciding upon a course of military intervention which, as Radowitz indicated, was the outcome desired by Germany 74 .
The primary goal of German Eastern policy was thus the same as it had been in the spring of 1875: Russia's expansion into the Balkan peninsula was being encouraged as a means of increasing her dependence upon Germany. Given the continuity of objectives and the similar circumstances of his mission and Manteuffel's special assignment, it is not surprising that in the course of the Russo-German negotiations in the summer of 1876, Radowitz found himself often reminded of the conversations he had had eighteen months earlier with his »personal benefactor«, Stremoukov 75 . In recalling these events Radowitz drew quiet satisfaction from his conviction that it was Stremoukov's unwillingness to follow his advice that was responsible for much of the difficulties in which Russia found herself. 
